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THE INVISIBILITY OF GENDER IN WAR
VALORIE K. VOJDIK*
Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on
th
September 11 , the United States launched a “war on terrorism” against the
1
Taliban and al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan. To help justify its military offensive, the White House initiated a campaign to condemn the oppression of
Afghan women at the hands of the Taliban, a repressive regime that enforced a
brutal form of gender apartheid against women that human rights organizations
2
and feminists had decried for years. As images of Afghan women covered in
blue burqas flooded the national media, however, the Pentagon continued to enforce its own form of gender apartheid in Saudi Arabia, requiring female military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia to comply with traditional Muslim
3
gender norms. The regulations prohibited female military personnel from
leaving their base off-duty unless they wore an abaya, the traditional head-to4
toe black robe required of Muslim women in Saudi Arabia, and unless they
5
were accompanied by a male. The military also prohibited female personnel
from driving vehicles off-base, requiring that they ride in the backseats of cars
6
driven by men.
The abaya regulations raise critical questions about the nature and meaning
of gender in the United States military – a masculine institution historically hostile to the presence of women. The regulations on their face treat female military
personnel differently than male personnel. But the regulations are not merely
“double standards” that violate the principle of formal equality. As this essay
argues, the regulations are better understood as an institutional practice that
construct and regulate the boundaries of gender in the military. A symbolic
form of gender apartheid, the regulations construct female military personnel as
women rather than warriors, separate from and different than their male comCopyright  2002 Valorie K. Vojdik.
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; J.D., New York
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1. Lionel Barber, America’s war: This week’s attack on the US was launched from within, and George
W. Bush’s fight against terrorism will be prosecuted at home as well as abroad, says Lionel Barber, FINANCIAL
TIMES (London), Sept. 14, 2001, at 22.
2. See Susan Baer, White House pushes for Afghan women’s rights; Bush faces pressure to ensure they
have say in new government, BALT. SUN, Nov. 16, 2001, at 16A.
3. John E. Mulligan, Female pilot sues U.S., alleging bias, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Dec. 5, 2001, at
A01.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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rades. Stripped of their uniforms and hidden under the abaya, female officers
are not “real” warriors, but merely women, subordinate and inferior. Ironically,
the abaya simultaneously erases the female body while highlighting its gender.
The regulations thus construct and reinforce the identity of the institution as
masculine and male, illustrating the powerful, yet often invisible, ways in which
the military continues to police the boundaries of gender to exclude women.
The abaya regulations became widely publicized in December 2001, when
Air Force Lt. Col. Martha McSally filed suit against the Secretary of Defense
challenging the regulations, which apply to eight hundred American women, as
7
violating her rights to religious freedom and equal protection. One of the first
female fighter pilots in the Air Force, McSally was the first woman to fly combat
8
sorties over Iraq in the mid-1990s. She has served as a flight commander and
9
has trained combat pilots deployed in Kosovo and South Korea. When she reported for duty in Saudi Arabia, however, she was told to put on an abaya over
10
her flak jacket. Riding to the air force base in the back seat of a car, McSally felt
invisible. “I cannot explain to you how humiliating it is to wear that thing,” she
11
said later.
The military argued that its regulations help protect American women
from harassment in this fundamentalist state, where religious officials are empowered to physically punish women who appear in public in violation of Mus12
lim dress codes. Saudi Arabia, however, does not require non-Muslim women
13
to wear the abaya. The State Department does not require its employees in
14
Saudi Arabia to wear an abaya, either on or off duty. McSally responds, “If we
were called into South Africa during apartheid, would we put our African15
American soldiers in separate quarters?” The abaya regulations undermine the
authority of females like McSally, encouraging male service members to disre16
spect female officers and peers. Her lawyer explains:
Two 18-year-old privates leave the base. The woman is covered head to toe.
The man wears a T-shirt, jeans and a baseball cap. When they get back to the
base, the guy says, “Woman, get behind me,” and tells her to walk 10 steps back.
17
Martha has seen this happen. It’s not good for morale.

Shortly after McSally filed suit, the United States military modified its
regulations to “strongly encourage,” but not require, that women wear the
7. Id.
8. Baer, supra note 2, at A01.
9. Mulligan, supra note 3, at A01.
10. Toby Harnden, ‘I cannot - I will not - put that thing on’ Martha McSally is the US Air Force’s
senior female jet pilot - so why is she risking her hard-won position for a principle?, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), January 15, 2002, at 15.
11. Id.
12. Edward T. Pound, Saudi rule looser than Pentagon’s, Muslim dress code doesn’t demand U.S.
women wear head-to-toe robe, USA TODAY, April 24, 2001, at 3A.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Christina Cheakalos et al., Dress Blues; Fighter pilot Martha McSally battles to liberate U.S. servicewomen in Saudi Arabia from a confining cloak, PEOPLE, Feb. 11, 2002, at 71.
16. Mulligan, supra note 3.
17. Id.
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abaya off-base. McSally’s complaint, however, generated public support from
diverse groups including women’s rights organizations, such as the National
Organization of Women, as well as conservative members of the religious right,
19
such as Jesse Helms and McSally’s counsel, the Rutherford Institute. While the
military sought to frame the requirements as necessary to good order and discipline, critics focused on the abaya as a powerful symbol that violates women’s
rights to equality and religious freedom. Women’s rights groups argued that
requiring women, but not men, to conform to traditional Muslim dress require20
ments discriminates on the basis of sex. Conservatives argued that the abaya is
a religious symbol of Muslim faith, and that the regulation improperly compels
female military personnel to adopt a tenet of the Muslim faith, in violation of
21
their religious freedom.
This conceptualization of the abaya as a means of subordination contrasts
sharply with the approach of federal courts, which consistently have upheld
military policies, including dress and grooming codes, that infringe on constitutional rights of religious freedom and equal protection. Courts have afforded
great deference to military judgment, ignoring the social meaning of military
practices by framing such disputes as conflicts between individual preferences
22
versus national security interests. Korematsu v. United States is perhaps the
most glaring example of judicial deference to military power, upholding the
government’s internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II as
23
24
a valid exercise of concern for wartime security. In Rostker v. Goldberg, the
Court upheld the exclusion of women from selective service registration, finding
that the male-only draft was justified in light of the statutory exclusion of
25
women from combat. In the decision, the Court agreed that the combat exclu26
sion was legitimate.

18. Military eases policy; But Muslim-dress flap continues for U.S. women, NEWSDAY, Jan. 24, 2002, at
A32. McSally continues to challenge the abaya policy, however, arguing that the regulations are coercive. There have been claims that, as a practical matter, individual commanders continue to enforce the requirement. Id.
19. Ann Gerhart, The Air Force’s flier in the ointment; Pilot sees partial victory in lawsuit over garb in
Saudi Arabia – but at what cost to her career?, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2002, at C1; Edward T. Pound, Senators
question military dress code: Women required to wear Saudi robe, SEATTLE TIMES, May 29, 2001, at A4.
20. See, e.g., Michele Keller, Female Fighter Pilot Battles U.S. Military’s Double-Standard in Saudi
Arabia, National Organization for Women, at http://www.now.org/nnt/spring-2002/mcsally.html
(last visited June 18, 2002) (arguing against “double standard” that requires female troops but not
female diplomats to wear abayas, and the “double standard” that prohibits male troops from wearing Saudi garb but requires female troops to wear it).
21. See Jeffrey Chandler, Women’s clothing ranks as hot topic for military, DAILY UNIVERSE VIA UWIRE, July 26, 2001 (quoting Seven H. Aden, counsel for the Rutherford Institute, as explaining inter
alia that “To put that outfit on an American servicewoman who may be of another faith, such as
Christian, as some of them are, is a little like putting a yarmulke on a service person because they
happen to be stationed in Jerusalem.”).
22. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
23. Id.
24. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
25. Id. at 77-78.
26. See id. at 83 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I assume what has not been challenged in this case-that excluding women from combat positions does not offend the Constitution.”); see also id. at 93
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Had appellees raised a constitutional challenge to the prohibition against
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Federal courts routinely have deferred to military judgments about appropriate behavior and conduct of uniformed personnel, especially where the
United States invokes claims of national security. Military dress codes have
long been upheld by federal courts, even those regulations that infringe on First
Amendment rights to religious freedom. The central issue for the courts is
whether the regulation is related to good discipline and order, as defined by the
27
military command. In Goldman v. Weinberger, for example, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the Army’s ban on service members wearing yarmulkes
28
while on duty. While acknowledging that the regulation infringed on the free
exercise right of Jewish service members, the Court deferred to the military’s
judgment that the dress code was necessary to maintain order and discipline. In
upholding the ban on yarmulkes and other military regulations, the courts explicitly have recognized as legitimate the asserted need for uniformity and cohesion within the armed services. The Court in Goldman found that the “essence of
military service” is the “subordination of the desires and interests of the indi29
vidual to the needs of the [military] service.” Rather than tolerate individuality, the military “must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and es30
prit de corps.” The Court deferred to the military’s judgment that uniforms
eliminate individual distinctions, except for rank, and encourage “a sense of hi31
erarchical unity.”
32
In United States v. Lugo, the Military Court of Appeals more recently upheld a Marine Corps regulation that prohibited male marines from wearing ear33
rings. A male enlisted marine corporal challenged the order on the grounds
that the earring ban (1) did not reasonably relate to military duty, but rather unreasonably interfered with the private rights of individual Marines; and (2) violated the right to equal protection guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
34
Fifth Amendment. The court rejected both claims. Citing Goldman v. Weinberger, the court held that the essence of military service involves the subordination
35
of individual desires to the needs of military service. Marine restrictions on the
civilian apparel and jewelry worn off-duty by Marines is designed to ensure that
off-duty Marines “do not dress in extreme or eccentric civilian attire that detracts from the public ‘spit-and-polish’ image of the United States Marine Corps
36
and the good order and discipline of its personnel.” While Goldman admitted
that the Army’s regulation infringed on Jewish service members’ right to practice their religion, Lugo ignored that the ban on males wearing earrings enforced
stereotypical norms of gender. While the court admitted that the regulations

assignment of women to combat, [the Senate’s findings] might well provide persuasive reasons for
upholding the restrictions.”).
27. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
28. Id. at 510.
29. Id. at 507.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 508.
32. 54 M.J. 558 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000).
33. Id. at 560.
34. Id. at 559-60.
35. Id. at 559.
36. Id. at 560.
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were “gender driven,” it accepted without analysis the social norms underlying
such gender distinctions and failed to consider whether the ban on males wearing earrings reflected, or perpetuated, stereotypical norms of masculinity.
Like the sex-specific ban on earrings upheld by the court in Lugo, the sexspecific requirement that women wear the abaya could be categorized by the
courts as a military dress code designed to advance good order within the mili38
tary and our national security interests in Saudi Arabia. Conceptualizing the
abaya as a gender-neutral dress regulation, however, ignores its social meaning
as a symbol of female subordination in the dominant U.S. culture. The abaya is
not gender-neutral, but an institutional practice that constructs and regulates
gender in the military, stigmatizes female military personnel as different and inferior.
To understand the meaning of the abaya requires shifting from a positivist
understanding of gender that underlies current jurisprudence, to a more structural analysis that locates gender as a social practice that intersects with a range
39
of social institutions, relationships, and constructs. As recent social theorists
have argued, gender is a social practice situated within structures of specific so40
cial relations and institutions. Gender constructs and maintains socially significant differences between men and women, differences that naturalize social
inequality between men and women and privilege the social definition and
41
characteristics of masculinity. Gender not only organizes social relations between individuals, but also organizes social structures such as the workplace,
42
state, and other organizations and institutions.
Institutions themselves are
gendered, relying on a range of social and institutional practices, both material
43
and symbolic, to enforce gender boundaries.

37. Lugo, 54 M.J. at 560.
38. In Romer v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Colorado statute that prohibited
the legislature from enacting laws to protect persons from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, holding that the law was based upon animus toward a particular group, and therefore
violated the basic requirement of equal protection. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). While Romer emphasizes the
anti-caste proscription inherent in the equal protection clause, the United States can invoke the need
to protect its troops from harm in Saudi Arabia, and the need to preserve national security – the type
of judgments in which the Court historically has deferred to the military.
39. See R.W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 71 (1995). My analysis of gender as a social institution
draws upon recent social theory, as more fully discussed in Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 68 (2002) (comparing
the conceptualization of gender as a social practice or institution with gender as a classificatory
scheme as used in current equal protection doctrine).
40. Sociologists R.W. Connell and Judith Lorber, for example, analyze gender as a social practice rather than a category or classification. See id. at 71-76 (defining gender as a social practice);
JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 1-5 (1994) (analyzing gender as “a process of social construction, a system of social stratification, and an institution that structures every aspect of our lives because of its embeddedness in the family, the workplace, and the state, as well as in sexuality, language and culture”).
41. PIERRE BOURDIEU, MASCULINE DOMINATION 8-12 (Richard Nice trans., Stanford Univ. Press
2001) (1998).
42. Lorber, supra note 40, at 6 (“Gender organizes social relations in everyday life as well as in
the major social structures, such as social class and the hierarchies of bureaucratic organizations.
The gendered microstructure and the gendered macrostructure reproduce and reinforce each
other.”) (citation omitted).
43. See BOURDIEU, supra note 41, at 24.
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Within the military, the abaya regulations are a powerful means of constructing and enforcing gender boundaries. The military is a quintessentially
masculine institution that historically excluded women. Even today, women
comprise only 14 percent of the armed services. Although statutory restrictions
44
on women in combat have been eliminated, the Army and the Marines con45
tinue to exclude women from the majority of combat positions. In this society,
and most others, the military constructs warriors as male and masculine, relying
on rites of institution that test the identity of individual men as masculine, while
reinforcing solidarity among men as a group.
As Joshua Goldstein argues, the relationship between gender and war is reciprocal: warriors are constructed as masculine, and masculinity is constructed
46
through war. Despite the social construction of warriors as masculine, war
47
does not come naturally to men. “War is hell,” as General MacArthur said. In
World War II, approximately one quarter of troops evacuated to Army facilities
were not physically injured, but were overwhelmed by battle, “babbling, crying,
48
shaking, or stunned, unable to hear or talk.” To induce men to fight, the military compels men to prove their identity as men through symbolic, and actual,
49
enactment of masculinity. As many theorists have observed, masculinity is
50
constructed “in front of and for other men and against femininity.” Rituals and
practices such as gang rape or group harassment function are “veritable tests of
manliness” that challenge men to prove their masculinity by eradicating the
51
feminine.
Within the military, such rituals abound. Warriors, the military teaches,
are male. From the beginning, drill sergeants humiliate recruits by calling them
52
“pussies,” “sissies,” “girls,” or “fags.”
Cadence calls, called joadies, often
denigrate women or celebrate male sexual domination of women. At the Naval
Academy in the late 1980s, the glee club favorite tune was “The S&M Man,”
53
sung to the tune of “The Candy Man.” The first verse went: “Who can take a
chain saw/Cut the bitch in two/Fuck the bottom half/and give the other half to
54
you.”
A formal photograph of a Marine platoon whose members graduated
from recruit training in 1989 shows the men posed with their drill instructors
“holding a blown-up picture of a naked women and a hand-lettered sign read-

44. JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN, WAR AND GENDER 87 (2001) (stating that, as of 1999, nearly 200,000
women served in the military).
45. Id. at 93, 98-99 (After the Gulf War, the Administration lifted Naval and Air Force restrictions on women in combat for almost all airplanes and ships, except submarines and Navy commandos. The Army opened combat support positions to women in 1994.).
46. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at 5-6.
47. Id. at 252-57.
48. Id. at 258.
49. Id. at 252.
50. See BOURDIEU, supra note 41, at 53; see also CONNELL, supra note 39, at 44 (“[M]asculinity and
femininity are inherently relational concepts, which have meaning in relation to each other, as a social demarcation and a cultural opposition.”).
51. BOURDIEU, supra note 41, at 52.
52. See LINDA BIRD FRANCKE, GROUND ZERO: THE GENDER WARS IN THE MILITARY 155 (1997)
(“Army drill sergeants in the early 90s still humiliated lagging male recruits by calling them ‘sissies,’
‘crybabies,’ and ‘girls.’”)
53. Id. at 190-91.
54. Id.
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ing, ‘kill, rape, pillage, burn.’” In 1994, ABC broadcast videotapes documenting sado-sexual hazing practices in the elite Marine Corps silent drill team,
56
during “Hell Night,” the culmination of a grueling training program. The videos showed a team leader painting military shoe polish containing toluene, a
57
caustic and hazardous substance, on the genitals of a new drill team member.
Masculinity is similarly enforced in the military through the feminization
58
of enemies and the symbolic (and often real) enactment of rape as domination.
During the Gulf War, for example, a U.S. pilot who shot down a male Iraqi pilot
59
triumphantly announced that he “cold smoked the bitch.” Rape is another
60
common means of sexually subordinating the enemy during wartime.
In
World War II, Japanese forces raped over 20,000 Chinese women and girls in
Nanking; Pakistani forces raped nearly 200,000 women during the war against
61
Bangladesh independence.
Gendered massacre has also been used to
“feminize” entire communities by murdering their men; in Bosnia, for example,
62
Serbs massacred Bosnian men and raped between 20,000 and 50,000 women.
Rape was also “a means of ethnic cleansing…central to the conquest” of Bosnian
63
people.
The integration of women into the military fundamentally challenges the
64
identity of the warrior as male, as Kenneth Karst and others have argued. The
decision to exclude women from combat explicitly has rested, inter alia, on the
military’s claim that women, like homosexuals, would undermine male bonding
and the cohesion of troops. In 1994, the Army issued a report that explained its
decision to continue to exclude women from combat, arguing that allowing
women in combat would undermine unit cohesion and disrupt the “unique
bonds” crucial to motivating men to fight in battle. Bonding and unit cohesion,
the Army concluded, are “best developed in a single gender all male environ65
ment” preserved from women.
This hyper-masculine military culture has fostered widespread hostility
66
toward, and harassment of, military women. According to a 1995 Department
of Defense study, nearly 70 percent of military women have experienced sexual
67
harassment in their workplace. An Army senior review panel similarly re-

55. Id. at 157.
56. See Prime Time Live (ABC television broadcast, July 28, 1994) (transcript #360-3).
57. Id.
58. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at 356.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 362.
61. Id. at 363.
62. Id. at 357, 363.
63. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at 363.
64. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38
UCLA L. REV. 499 (1991); Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture, 45 DUKE
L.J. 651, 748-753 (1996) (discussing the “phenomenon of linking military identity with masculinity”).
65. Id. at 194-195.
66. For a detailed discussion of the culture of harassment against women in the military, see
generally FRANKE, supra note 52.
67. Heather Antecol and Deborah Cobb-Clark, The Sexual Harassment of Female Active-Duty Personnel: Effects on Job Satisfaction and Intentions to Remain in the Military, April 2, 2002, at 7-8, available at
http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/labor/antecol.pdf (stating that data from the Department of Defense’s 1995 Status of the Armed Forces Surveys: Form B-Gender Issues establish that “70.9 percent
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ported in 1997 that 80 percent of men and 84 percent of women reported experiencing inappropriate harassment such as “crude or offensive actions, sexism,
68
unwanted sexual attention or more serious problems like assault.” Symbolic
violence often spills over to actual violence toward women.
The Tailhook scandal graphically illustrated the widespread hostility and
violence toward women in the Navy. The Tailhook Association is an elite group
of Naval pilots who have achieved a tailhook landing on an aircraft carrier. At
its annual convention in 1991, 83 women filed complaints that they had been
sexually assaulted by male pilots on the urine- and beer-soaked floors of the
third floor of the conference hotel, where hospitality suites featured female
69
strippers and prostitutes. Women were forced to walk through a gauntlet of
nearly 300 men who groped, pinched and fondled their buttocks, breasts and
70
genitals. A Pentagon report concluded that such attacks had occurred at Tail71
hook conventions since 1988. According to a Pentagon report, many of the attendees viewed the conference as a “free-fire zone,” in which the officers “could
act indiscriminately and without fear of censure or retribution in matters of sex72
ual conduct or drunkenness.” For example, male Naval officers engaged in
Tailhook “traditions” such as walking around with their testicles protruding
from their pants, “mooning” and “streaking,” shaving women’s legs, and a host
of other sexualized behavior. In one incident, male officers publicly shaved a
73
woman’s pubic hair.
Other similar incidents have escaped public notice. Before the Tailhook incident, another group of Navy men gang raped a female helicopter pilot, enact74
ing the sexualized violence toward women glorified in the joadies. Francke reth
ports that at Fort Hood, Texas, in the 1970s, “the rape rate was so high that 6
75
Air Cavalry assault helicopters flew nightly patrols over the base.”
The admission of women into the federal service academies met with
similar harassment and abuse. At the Naval Academy, male midshipmen denigrated their female classmates with “WUBA” jokes that transformed women
from equals into sexualized subjects of male violence and power. WUBA, a term
that referred to the first female uniforms (“Working Uniform Blue Alpha”) was
used by male midshipmen as an acronym for female midshipmen, but translated
76
to mean “Women Used By All.” “What do you call a mid who fucks a WUBA?
Too lazy to beat off. What is the difference between a warthog and a WUBA?
77
About 200 pounds, but the WUBA has more hair.” Misogynistic cadence calls
of active-duty women reported experiencing some type of sexually harassing behavior in the twelve
months prior to the survey”).
68. Nolan Walters, Army announces changes to reduce sexual harassment, improve gender equality,
KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE NEWS SERV., Sept. 11, 1997, at K8778.
69. Mark Thompson, Tailhook case lands 140; Inquiry describes a sexual “free-fire” zone, HOUS.
CHRON., April 24, 1993, at A1.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. FRANCKE, supra note 52, at 181.
75. Id. at 165.
76. See, e.g., id. at 204-205; see generally 183-219 (1997); JEAN ZIMMERMAN, TAILSPIN: WOMEN AT
WAR IN THE WAKE OF TAILHOOK 239 (1995).
77. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 76, at 239.
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continued after women were admitted, identifying war with sexualized violence. According to one report, for example, midshipmen ran in formation to
78
the cadence “Rape, Maim, Kill Babies. Rape, Maim, Kill Babies.” A 1994 GAO
report documented continued resistance to women in the service academies: 50
percent of female Naval midshipmen and 59 percent of female Air Force cadets
79
reported experiencing some form of harassment at least twice a month. At
West Point, half of female cadets experienced offensive gestures, posters or graffiti, and derogatory comments at least once a month; one in six reported being
repeated targets of “unwanted horseplay or hijinks;” and one in seven reported
80
“unwanted sexual advances.”
Within this masculine institution, sexual harassment and denigration of
females and femininity serves a regulatory function, policing the boundaries
between the sexes, punishing women (as well as men) who transgress the
81
bounds of gender. By exaggerating gender differences, harassment sends the
82
message that women do not belong in this male preserve.
The abaya rules similarly enforce gender boundaries within the military,
constructing the identity of warriors as male and masculine while simultaneously excluding women as different and inferior. The decision to require female
military personnel to wear the abaya on its face treats women differently than
men – violating the military’s asserted need to subordinate individual preferences and promote cohesion by enforcing uniformity of appearance among its
members. Though their lives are equally at risk, females like Lt. Col. McSally
are treated differently than their male peers simply based on their sex. But the
abaya requirement is not merely a “double standard” that violates formal
equality. It is an institutional practice that constructs female military personnel
as women rather than warriors. In a culture which seeks to subordinate the individual to the collective group, the abaya symbolically and materially excludes
female officers as warriors. It not only marks women as separate from and different than men, but erases their identity and status as warriors. It is a symbolic
form of gender apartheid, enforcing the bounds of gender within an institution
that otherwise insists that uniformity of appearance is critical for good order
and discipline.
While the military has argued that the abaya requirement is culturally
“sensitive” to the conservative Muslim society in Saudi Arabia, that argument
ignores that the meaning of the abaya is not fixed or essential, but socially and
culturally specific. As a religious practice among Muslims in Saudi Arabia, the
abaya is a form of hijab, the Muslim doctrine that compels men and women to
83
dress modestly. While many in the U.S. understand the practice as a means of
gender subordination in a society that overtly discriminates against women,

78. Id. at 238.
79. FRANKE, supra note 52, at 191.
80. Id. at 204.
81. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1756-61 (1998) (arguing that sexual harassment serves to undermine women’s competence within the workplace, preserving the definition of the job as male and masculine.).
82. Id. at 1760.
83. See, e.g., Jennifer Sposito, Uncovering the truth behind traditional Muslim hijab, GUARDIAN VIA
U-WIRE, May 23, 2002.
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many Muslims consider the abaya or hijab to symbolize the commitment to liv84
ing a life of goodness and nobility prescribed by the Koran.
Within the U.S. military culture, however, the abaya requirement is a powerful symbol of the subordination and inferiority of female troops. By requiring
female military personnel like McSally to conform to restrictions imposed on
Muslim women in Saudi Arabia, the military compels the ritual enactment of
gender subordination. McSally as a military officer becomes invisible; she instead appears as a feminized subject of male domination, both powerless and
subject to violation. Rather than promote order and discipline, the requirement
encourages male military personnel to disrespect their female officers, as
McSally reports. Like sexual harassment, the rules operate to humiliate and
punish those women who transgress the bounds of gender within our society.
At the same time, the identity of warriors as male is reinforced and the boundaries of gender in the military are preserved.
Focusing on the social meaning of the abaya requirement is an important
step toward making gender visible in this historically masculine institution.
Like the misogynistic cadence calls and ritualistic harassment of women at Tailhook, the abaya requirement actively constructs and reaffirms the identity of the
military and its warriors as male and masculine. Reconceptualizing gender as a
social practice that occurs within specific institutions, including the military, reveals the complex ways in which gender is constructed within institutions themselves.

84. Id.; see also Barbara Brotman, In praise of the veil, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 2001, at C1 (discussing
the range of views of the meaning of hijab among Muslim women).

